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I.  Introduction
Congress passed both the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA” or “the Act”) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) in reaction to national corruption and bribery scandals.​[2]​  The reputation and integrity of American companies were under attack as these scandals unraveled and made international news.  Allegations of fraud, bribery and illegal practices plagued corporate America.  Congress needed legislation to address these problems to ensure its own country, as well as the international community, that the legislature would not tolerate corrupt business practices.  The FCPA was enacted to decrease corruption and bribery and to improve the accuracy of accounting and record-keeping of companies, and the SOX was enacted for very similar purposes, yet twenty five years later.  The FCPA requires companies to report their financial information in accordance with its provisions, while the SOX requires the Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers of public companies to guarantee that their financial reports are accurate.​[3]​  During the first twenty five years after the FCPA was enacted, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) did not conduct many investigations into companies that had potentially violated the Act’s provisions.  However, in the aftermath of the Enron​[4]​ and WorldCom​[5]​ scandals, which lead to the enactment of the SOX in 2002 and subsequent increased international awareness of the problems of bribery and financial fraud, there has been a significant increase in FCPA enforcement.​[6]​ 
The recent increase of FCPA investigations and prosecutions over the past several years has raised one main question regarding the DOJ & SEC’s sudden increased enforcement – why enforce the FCPA now?  Although the goals of the Act were to combat bribery and to ensure that companies maintained proper books and records, the DOJ and SEC’s years of “relaxed” enforcement did little to contribute towards achieving these goals.  Further, despite the DOJ’s goal of “enforcing the FCPA to root out global corruption and preserve the integrity of the world’s market,”​[7]​ American companies have continued to engage in bribery and financial fraud and misconduct.  The problems that the enactment of the FCPA sought to eliminate have continued to occur, as evidenced by the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the early 2000s.  These scandals served as a reminder to the legislature that the problems they sought to fix by enacting the FCPA were still extremely prevalent in corporate America. 
This note argues that the recent surge of FCPA enforcement is in part a result of the enactment of the SOX.  Congress enacted the SOX to address the problems of bribery and financial fraud again, by making the penalties more severe and imposing responsibility on company’s executives to certify the accuracy of their accounts and records.   The financial scandals and frauds that plagued corporate America in the early 2000s and the heightened awareness of the importance of maintaining accurate books and records have developed since the SOX was enacted.  Part II of this note examines the reasons surrounding the enactment of the FCPA and its two provisions while Part III discusses penalties that are imposed on corporations for violating the Act.  Part IV analyzes recent enforcement trends and Part V explores the theory that the SOX and increased international awareness of the importance of ending corruption and maintaining accurate financials have served as incentives to increase enforcement of the FPCA.  Part VI is the conclusion, outlining steps that companies can take to ensure compliance with the FCPA.
II. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 to bolster the integrity and reputation of American companies both nationally and abroad after the negative publicity that accompanied the Watergate scandal.   The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (“The Committee”) held hearings to discuss improper payments and bribes that had been made by American companies to foreign government officials and to determine what could be done to prevent these situations from continuing to occur in the future.​[8]​   In 1976, the SEC presented a Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (“The Report”) to the Committee, which discussed investigations by the SEC that had discovered questionable or illegal payments made by several hundred companies to foreign government officials, politicians and political parties that “represented a serious breach in the operation of the Commission's system of corporate disclosure.”  The corresponding House Report noted that over 400 companies had reported paying over $300 million in corporate funds to foreign government officials, politicians and political parties.​[9]​  It also commented that the payment of bribery “is counter to the moral expectations and values of the American public.  But not only is it unethical, it is bad business as well.”​[10]​  Congress enacted the FCPA to address these unethical and “bad” business practices as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
The Act has two main parts: (1) the prohibition against the bribery of foreign officials, and (2) the requirements for accounting and record-keeping provisions. For any FCPA investigation, it is necessary to consider whether the anti-bribery provisions or the accounting and record-keeping provisions, or both, have been violated.  Each provision must be considered separately, noting that often a violation of one provision leads to the violation of the other (i.e., if a company is bribing a foreign official, they are more likely to conceal the payment on their accounts, as opposed to recording such payment as bribe).
Anti-bribery prohibitions
Under the anti-bribery provisions of the Act, for-profit companies are prohibited from making payments with a corrupt intent to foreign officials​[11]​ for the purpose of either obtaining or retaining business for or with the company, or directing business to the company.​[12]​  This includes corrupt payments related to the execution or performance of a contract, the continuance of existing business arrangements, or the development of preferred status or more favorable treatment.​[13]​ The anti-bribery provisions also include three distinct, but essentially similar, provisions that apply to foreign officials, as well as foreign political parties or officials thereof, and candidates for foreign political office. ​[14]​  The FCPA also prohibits corrupt payments through intermediaries.​[15]​  For example, it is unlawful to make a payment to a third party while knowing that all (or a part of) the payment will go directly or indirectly to a foreign official.  Importantly, the term “knowing” includes conscious disregard and deliberate ignorance.  The FCPA does not require that the corrupt act be successful, but rather the mere offer or promise of a bribe violates the Act.   
An important exception to the anti-bribery provisions allows companies to make facilitating payments to foreign officials in order “to expedite or secure the performance of a routine governmental action” by that individual.​[16]​ Facilitating payments are often related to the performance of a nondiscretionary act that an official is already obligated to perform.  They are typically payments related to issues that are automatic or involve only a matter of time.​[17]​  Although this exception is lawful under the FCPA, it is necessary for companies to exercise extreme caution in trying to determine whether or not the DOJ or SEC would consider the payment to be facilitating.  Companies must also be aware of the potential risk of falling down a “slippery slope” where facilitating payments can aggregate and eventually lead to the issuance of improper payments.  Further, while these payments are acceptable under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, if they are not properly recorded, problems may still arise under the accounting and record-keeping provisions of the Act.  Another potential problem will arise if American companies issue a facilitating payment to an individual in a foreign country, which prohibits the use of such payments.  In these countries, an individual who accepts facilitating payments may face criminal liability under his country’s legal system, although the company that made the payment would not face liability under the FCPA.​[18]​  
Accounting and record-keeping prohibitions
The FCPA’s accounting and record-keeping provisions, along with the anti-bribery provisions, were added to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in 1977.​[19]​  One of the principles behind the enactment of the FCPA was the idea “that accurate recordkeeping is an essential ingredient in promoting management responsibility.”​[20]​  Under these provisions, companies must devise and maintain internal controls and procedures that sufficiently monitor their accounts and records in reasonable detail so that such accounts and records accurately reflect their financial transactions.  These provisions prohibit companies from concealing bribes and from engaging in fraudulent accounting and reporting.  In essence, they give “the SEC authority over the entire financial management and reporting requirements of publicly held United States corporations.”​[21]​  The accounting provisions of the FCPA require every issuer of securities (i.e., businesses registered with the SEC under section 12 or required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) to make and maintain accurate books, records and accounts, while also developing a system of internal accounting controls.​[22]​
In order to ensure that the books, records and accounts are kept with “reasonable detail,” such records must be kept in “such level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.”​[23]​  The accounting and record-keeping provisions apply to all payments made by issuers of securities, not just payments that would be considered material in the traditional financial sense.  While requiring every payment to be recorded is a departure from other U.S. securities laws, relatively small amounts of money, if not properly recorded, can easily aggregate and lead to violations of the FCPA.​[24]​   
III.  Penalties for FCPA Violations
	The DOJ and SEC are jointly responsible for enforcement of the Act, which has a five-year statute of limitations on all criminal and civil claims.​[25]​  
Criminal Sanctions
The DOJ is responsible for investigating and prosecuting all criminal charges under the Act.​[26]​  Companies can face up to $2 million in criminal sanctions for violating the anti-bribery provisions.​[27]​  Criminal violations of the accounting and record-keeping provisions can lead to fines of up to $25 million.​[28]​  The DOJ often considers the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“The Guidelines”) for determining the exact monetary amount of each fine.​[29]​  The Guidelines take into account any history of prior violations, the monetary gain obtained by the company and any steps taken by the offender to prevent violations.​[30]​  The court may warrant an upward departure (i.e., imposition of a sentence harsher than the Guidelines propose), if  “the organization, in connection with the offense, bribed or unlawfully gave a gratuity to a public official, or attempted or conspired to bribe or unlawfully give gratuity to a public official.”​[31]​  Parent companies may be liable and face criminal sanctions if found responsible for authorizing, directing or controlling the questionable acts of foreign subsidiaries or intermediaries.​[32]​  While officers, directors, stockholders, employees and agents of the company may also face criminal sanctions for violating the Act, companies may not pay for any fines that are imposed on individuals.​[33]​  
Civil Sanctions
The SEC is the enforcement authority for civil sanctions under the FCPA.  While the DOJ may pursue civil enforcement as well, their focus has been almost entirely on criminal violations.​[34]​  There is no knowledge requirement for a civil enforcement action for violating the accounting and record-keeping provisions and the preponderance of evidence must be “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Companies can face up to $10 thousand in civil sanctions for violating the Act.​[35]​  Similar to criminal sanctions, while officers, directors, stockholders, employees and agents of the company may also face civil sanctions for violating the Act, companies may not pay for any fines that are imposed on individuals.​[36]​  
Other Penalties
	In addition to criminal and civil sanctions, companies may face other penalties as a result of violating provisions of the FCPA.  Under the Guidelines, the court may order probation for up to five years if the company has more than fifty employees and the company does not have an effective compliance and ethics program, or if the company had engaged in similar misconduct within five years prior.​[37]​  Companies may also receive sanctions for violating the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention” or “the Convention”),​[38]​ as it provides that “ the bribery of a foreign public official shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.”​[39]​  Violations under the OECD Convention do not have a designated statute of limitations period, but rather the statute “shall allow an adequate period of time for investigation and prosecution.”​[40]​  Under federal criminal laws (other than the FCPA), the court is authorized to impose an even higher penalty if any pecuniary gain was derived from the offense – the fine imposed may be the greater of either twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss that the company received.​[41]​  In addition, the court may also impose additional non-FCPA civil fines that do “not exceed the greater of (i) the gross amount of the pecuniary gain to the defendant as a result of the violation, or (ii) a specified dollar limitation,” which the court determines by the severity of the FCPA violation.​[42]​  
Companies who violate the FCPA may be barred from doing business with the federal government and indictment alone may automatically lead to suspension of this right.  Further, companies may be ineligible to receive export licenses.​[43]​  Bribery payments made to foreign officials may not be deducted under American tax laws as business expenses.​[44]​  The Commodities Future Trading Commission and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) may suspend or debar a company’s membership in its respective agency programs for a FCPA violation.  OPIC will not support a project if one of the parties has “engaged in corrupt, fraudulent or unethical activities.”​[45]​  



IV.  FCPA Enforcement Trends
Historically for the majority of the FCPA’s enactment, the DOJ and SEC have been rather lax in enforcing the Act.​[46]​  However, in recent years, the SEC and DOJ have become increasingly aggressive in investigating potential FCPA investigations.​[47]​  In one of the first FCPA cases to be litigated to trial, the court notes that the SEC “apparently intends to rely heavily on the Act to address management misfeasance, misuse of corporate assets and other conduct reflecting adversely on management’s integrity.”​[48]​  Although the SEC did not actually rely “heavily” on the Act to address these issues until recently, statistics document the increased enforcement trends that occurred in the early 2000s.  In 2004, there were new investigations reported involving 22 companies; followed by investigations of 13 companies in 2005; investigations of 26 companies in 2006 and investigations of 29 companies in 2007.​[49]​  
In addition to the growth of investigations, there has also been a large increase in the overall number of prosecutions for companies that have violated the FCPA .  Between 2003 and 2007, the average number of new DOJ prosecutions was three times more than the average number in the preceding five years.​[50]​  Between 1990 and 1995, the SEC did not bring any proceedings for FCPA violations but from 2001 to 2006, the SEC averaged 4 proceedings annually and in 2007, the SEC brought 16 new proceedings.​[51]​  The SEC is bringing more cases under the accounting and record-keeping provisions in situations where the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA have not been violated. 
The increased number of investigations and proceedings has also led to the imposition of larger penalties on companies who violate the FCPA.​[52]​   The “record” of the highest ever FCPA penalty is continually being topped each subsequent year.  In 2006, Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. paid $7.7 million in disgorgement​[53]​ while its Korean subsidiaries paid a DOJ fine of $7.5 million for allegedly giving cash payments and other gifts to Chinese officials working at government-owned steel mills.​[54]​  The following year, in April 2007, Baker Hughes paid a $44 million fine, representing a criminal fine of $11 million and a disgorgement of $33 million, which at the time was the largest FCPA penalty ever assessed.  Baker Hughes allegedly paid $5.2 million to foreign agents to bribe officials of state-owned companies in Kazakhstan to direct business towards the company, which included an oil services contract that generated more than $219 million in gross revenues for the company between 2001 and 2006. ​[55]​  The complaint also alleged that the company violated its books and records with regard to its business in Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan by failing to implement internal controls to monitor whether these payments were made for legitimate services.​[56]​
The standing largest FCPA fine occurred in December 2008, when Siemens AG paid $350 million in disgorgement fees and a $450 million criminal fine to the DOJ.  These amounts are in addition to a $569 million fine to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich, Germany.​[57]​  The SEC entered a settlement agreement with Siemens AG on the basis of SEC charges that the company had paid bribes on numerous transactions, including the construction of metropolitan transit lines in Venezuela, power plants in Israel, and refineries in Mexico.​[58]​ The company also allegedly obtained business in Bangladesh, Argentina, Vietnam, China and Russia by bribery.  Furthermore, the SEC complaint contends that Siemens paid kickbacks to Iraqi officials for sales under the United Nation Oil for Food Program.  Siemens earned more than $1.1 billion in profits as a result of these bribes and other transactions.​[59]​  This is the largest FCPA penalty to date and Cheryl J. Scarboro, an Associate Director in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement notes:
The day is past when multi-national corporations could regard illicit payments to foreign officials as simply another cost of doing business.  The $1.6 billion in combined sanctions that Siemens will pay in the U.S. and Germany should make clear that these corrupt business practices will be rooted out wherever they take place, and the sanctions for them will be severe.​[60]​

Increased enforcement numbers and continually increasing fines are certainly sending a message to American companies that the DOJ and SEC are serious when it comes to enforcing the FCPA.  Despite years of relaxed enforcement, FCPA investigations and fines are higher than ever and companies must comply with the FCPA or else risk being the next victim of an FCPA investigation that will result in topping the Siemens’ highest fine.
V.  Why the Sudden FCPA Enforcement Surge?
Despite Congress’s intention of combating bribery by enacting the FCPA, bribery still continued to thrive for the majority of the Act’s existence​[61]​ and investigations and prosecutions have been rare.   However, in recent years, since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act following the Enron and WorldCom scandals,​[62]​ FCPA enforcement trends have changed as numerous companies, particularly health care companies​[63]​ have been investigated by the SEC and DOJ for potential FCPA violations.​[64]​  It seems as though the FCPA has now “come of age,”​[65]​ as demonstrated by the aggressive enforcement of recent years.  

The SOX has served as a reminder the fraud continues and the enactment of this new legislation has served as a stimulus towards increasing FCPA enforcement

The purpose of the SOX’s enactment was “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws.”​[66]​  The 11 titles of the SOX establish financial accountings standards for U.S. public company boards, management and public accounting firms.  When signing it into law, President George W. Bush commented that it was “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”​[67]​  Bush also noted that the enactment of the SOX should lead towards the end of corporate fraud and that the individuals or companies responsible for corrupt actions will be punished accordingly.​[68]​  In making these comments, one has to wonder if Bush forgot that the FCPA was enacted since Roosevelt’s 1933 – 1945 presidential term, or if he simply felt that the FCPA did not have the same affect of being a “far-reaching reform” that seriously impacted the way that American companies conducted business in the same way he thought the SOX would change corporate America.  Regardless of his intentions, despite the reforms that the FCPA sought to impose, the FCPA had been extremely under-enforced and bribery and fraud were still rampant when the SOX came into law.  
While Congress enacted new legislation to help end corporate fraud, the goals of the of the old legislation in the accounting provisions of the FCPA and the new legislation in Section 404​[69]​ of the SOX are rather similar: both seek to improve the accuracy of financial reporting while providing assurance for investors that the companies in which they are investing are operating with integrity and honesty.​[70]​  The FCPA places responsibility on the companies in general to maintain proper internal controls while the SOX places responsibility on the companies’ officers to maintain the internal controls.​[71]​   Despite this shift in responsibility, the DOJ and SEC are repeatedly turning more and more towards the FCPA to help not only combat bribery of international foreign officials, but also to help monitor companies’ accounting and record keeping measures.​[72]​  By conducting FCPA investigations, they are able to examine a company’s accounts and records and detect fraud by discovering inconsistencies in the financial records, which may be the result of concealed bribery payments.​[73]​ 
While the SOX modifies governance, reporting and disclosure rules for public companies, increases criminal and civil penalties for securities fraud and requires internal control certification by Chief Executive Officers and Chief Finance Officers, “all changes made by the [SOX] had been discussed among corporate governance and accounting devotees for years.”​[74]​  Sections of the SOX regarding the maintenance of proper books and records mirror the provisions of the FCPA, which had already existed for twenty-five years before the SOX was enacted.  It is almost as if the SOX reminded the DOJ and SEC to “rev up” the enforcement of the FCPA, because the problems it sought to eliminate were not only still in existence, but they were also so prevalent that Congress chose to enact new, harsher legislation to help remedy the situation.  One scholar comments that the changes imposed by the SOX are “more likely to have psychological than substantive effects.”​[75]​  One of these “psychological effects” seems to have been a heightened attentiveness to the accounting and record-keeping provisions, which also has triggered attention to similar provisions under the FCPA.
The SOX has been implemented to monitor the financial reporting of businesses in an era where the majority of affairs are conducted electronically and records are no longer kept with pen and paper.  In 2003, a year after the SOX was enacted, it was estimated that 93% of business records were in digital form.​[76]​  This shift in technology has perhaps made it even easier for companies to falsify their records,​[77]​ so much so that companies were able to engage in massive accounting frauds without being detected.  The financial scandals of the early 2000s have shown that it is not enough to rely on the integrity of a company or the words of its auditors or even its attorneys.​[78]​  Instead, another mechanism must be used to ensure proper corporate governance and accurate financial reporting and recently, that mechanism has been the FCPA.  These financial fraud and accounting scandals have plagued numerous corporations, but “there is a real risk of the potential for over-regulation in the post-Enron era,”​[79]​ to prove to these corporations now that the DOJ and SEC appear determined to put an end to such scandals.  Arguably, the heightened enforcement of the FCPA in the post-Enron era is not necessarily “over-regulation,” but instead “appropriate” regulation that failed to occur in the years aft the Act was enacted.  The scandals before the enactment of the SOX demonstrate that the need to combat bribery and end financial fraud still exists in corporate America and the FCPA should be used as a tool to help achieve these goals.  
The SOX has led to increased voluntarily disclosure of FCPA violations
The SOX requires that CEOs and CFOs take numerous steps to be more aware of their companies’ financial statements and internal controls.​[80]​  If they subsequently learn of or discover problems that violate the FCPA in the course of fulfilling their duties under the SOX, they cannot make the required certification without exposing themselves to personal liability under the SOX. As companies and its executives are taking the necessary efforts to comply with the SOX’s internal control rules, they are discovering, and many are subsequently also reporting, violations of the FCPA’s accounting and record-keeping provisions.  CEOs and CFOs would rather engage in a seemingly “quieter” FCPA self-disclosure to government entities, instead of risking their personal reputation and the reputation of their company by engaging in litigation to dispute the charges when their crimes are discovered and exposed by the government, either under the FCPA or the SOX.  Further, companies have great incentive to resolve these violations quickly, without the “flurry of unwanted media attention and the corresponding depreciation in stock value that accompanies a bribery scandal.”​[81]​  The increased enforcement trends have encouraged more companies to voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations to the DOJ and/or SEC.  
By cooperating with SEC and DOJ authorities and their investigations, companies are more likely to be able to enter non-prosecution agreements or deferred prosecutions with the government.​[82]​   From 2004 to 2008, the DOJ entered into an increased number of non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements with companies.​[83]​  Many times, these agreements were the result of voluntary disclosure and a company’s proof of continuing FCPA compliance.​[84]​  As a result of the favorable terms that come with non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, numerous companies have been admitting to possible violations of the FCPA in hopes of being able to enter such agreements.​[85]​  One recent article notes that 44 of the 68 FCPA investigations started between 2005 and 2007 were the result of voluntary disclosures by the company to the SEC or DOJ.​[86]​ 
The enactment of the SOX has served as a stimulus for corporate officials to realize that the government is serious about combating bribery and ensuring that corporations are engaging in accurate accounting methods.​[87]​  Although executives (as well as the corporations they work for) can still face penalties under the SOX, it seems as though they would rather face an FCPA investigation on their own terms, instead of waiting for their bad acts to be discovered by the SEC or DOJ.  Further, they may face harsher and increased monetary penalties for violating the accounting and record-keeping provisions under the SOX.​[88]​ Companies hope that by timely reporting of potential FCPA violations, the DOJ and SEC will be kinder when imposing penalties and sanctions.  As such, they are more likely to expose their FCPA violations and hope that they can “get a break” from the government after the DOJ or SEC conducts their investigation.​[89]​ A company that voluntarily discloses a potential violation and continues to cooperate through the investigation is more likely to receive favorable treatment when the investigation is completed and penalties are imposed.​[90]​  A significant number of cases brought by the DOJ are resolved through plea agreements and very few cases go to trial.  Through self-disclosure, companies are more likely be to join the majority of violators who plea agreements instead of the minority of violators who are brought to trial.​[91]​
Foreign companies doing business in the United States are now more likely to be held accountable under the FCPA

	FCPA enforcement numbers continue to increase and recent investigations send a clear message that in addition to facing liability for committing a prohibited act while doing business in the United States,​[92]​ if a foreign company trades in the United States or benefits from American capital markets, that company may also be held accountable to the FCPA provisions.  As such, these companies will likely face penalties if they do not comply with the anti-bribery or accounting and record-keeping provisions.   For example, In December 2007, Akzo Nobel N.V., a Netherlands-based pharmaceutical company that manufacturers human and animal health care products, was brought under FCPA investigation because two of the company’s subsidiaries authorized and made approximately $280 thousand of improper payments to the Iraqi government.​[93]​  The SEC complaint alleges that despite the company’s foreign place of incorporation and headquarters, the European company was still subject to FCPA liability because its American Depository Receipts were traded on the American National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (“NASDAQ”) at a time when the alleged misconduct occurred in Iraq.​[94]​
	FCPA enforcement has also increased as a result of working with other countries to combat bribery.  Although the coordination that exists between various governments and agencies is “not fully apparent,” in recent years, investigation by one government has been leading to investigation by another government.​[95]​  For example, investigation by the Norwegian government into the corrupt activities conducted by Statoil in 2002 and 2003 eventually led to a 2006 SEC and DOJ FCPA investigation into the company.​[96]​ The Statoil investigation also represents the first time the DOJ took criminal enforcement actions against a foreign issuer for violating the FCPA.​[97]​	
International interest in corporate governance has changed since the SOX
Compliance with FCPA originally put American companies at a significant disadvantage compared to their foreign counterparts, as most were able to pay bribes in the course of conducting business without facing penalties and/or were able to deduct bribes as business expenses on their taxes.​[98]​  In 1997, the U.S. and thirty-three countries​[99]​ signed the OECD Convention, the purpose of which was to ensure that international companies were taking measures to eliminate the bribery of foreign officials and that countries were imposing sanctions for such behavior.​[100]​  The OECD Convention recognizes that bribery is “a widespread phenomenon in international business transactions” and that all countries should be responsible for combating bribery.​[101]​  Countries that had signed on to the Convention supposedly began conducting business in accordance with the anti-bribery and accounting and record-keeping regulations and requirements.  This international change in business practices should have allowed American companies to follow the FCPA and still remain competitive with their foreign competitors who were following similar provisions.​[102]​  However, despite the enactment of the OECD Convention, corruption continued to exist in particular regions of the world​[103]​ and in numerous industries.​[104]​  Eighteen of the thirty-three signatory countries have not prosecuted any individuals or corporations for corruption.​[105]​  In 2006 and 2007, the United States brought more prosecutions than all of the other thirty-three countries combined.​[106]​  
Since the enactment of the OECD, there has been an increased interest in combating corruption in the past decade, as demonstrated by the enactment of other numerous regional conventions: Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,​[107]​ the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,​[108]​ the Civil Law Convention on Corruption,​[109]​ the African Union Convention on Preventing Corruption​[110]​ and the UN Convention Against Corruption.​[111]​  In addition, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have instituted policies that allow investigations into companies and governments that have committed corrupt acts.​[112]​  These conventions and policies show a heightened international commitment to fighting bribery.  The latter three conventions  (Civil Law Convention on Corruption, African Union Convention on Preventing Corruption, UN Convention Against Corruption) were all adopted after the SOX, whose provisions helped spark a renewed international interest in adopting more stringent accounting provisions.  
Also since the SOX’s enactment in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union have passed new corporate governance legislation, which are consistent with the U.S. regulations by placing greater responsibilities on companies.​[113]​  The United Kingdom’s Companies (Audit, Investigation and Community Enterprise) Act of 2004 helps to eliminate the close relationship between corporations and auditing firms,​[114]​ which was one of the problems that led to the Enron scandal in the United States.​[115]​  The Act allows auditors to obtain complete access to all information pertaining to a company’s accounts, as well as giving them the ability to force corporate executives to provide them with any information they need to properly perform their auditing duties.​[116]​  Each corporate director must state in his director’s report that, “so far as he is aware, there is no relevant audit information of which the company’s auditors are unaware” and he must certify that he has taken all necessary measures to ensure his awareness of all relevant audit information pertaining to the company.​[117]​  The European Union Council Directive 2006/43 (“the Directive”) requires that auditors operate independently from their employers.​[118]​  It is the responsibility of the European Union Member States to prohibit auditors from auditing companies with which the auditor has “any direct or indirect financial, business, employment or other relationship.”​[119]​  The adoption of these measures shows that the European Union is placing greater accountability on companies to ensure that their financial audit reports are accurate.  The SOX is increasing the responsibilities placed on companies by the FCPA, which in turn is increasing the regulation of corporate activities, and the international community is starting to follow a similar trend.​[120]​
This of course is not to say that the enactment of international anti-corruption laws and accounting regulations are necessarily being enforced to their full extent, similar to the FCPA when it was first enacted.  Rather these are small steps, in the right direction, towards ending corruption in the international community.  As gradually more countries are recognizing that bribery and financial fraud are problems, it is likely that they will impose their regulations more aggressively.  While it has taken a longer period of time for the international community to react, enact and enforce regulations that mirror the requirements of the FCPA and SOX, it appears as though the international community is starting to recognize the problems of corruption and anti-bribery that the U.S. initially discovered in 1977.  The global adoption of some of the provisions of the SOX​[121]​ indicate that requiring American companies to follow accounting standards under the FCPA is no longer putting these companies at a disadvantage when competing for business with international companies. Because the international community has taken numerous efforts towards combating bribery and regulating accounting requirements, American companies are able to compete more successfully for international contracts, while still following the anti-bribery and accounting and record-keeping provisions of the FCPA.   
With international countries slowly beginning to enforce their anti-corruption laws, it is no longer as much of a necessity for American companies to pay bribes in order to remain competitive.​[122]​ In the past, American companies were losing overseas contracts because of inability to pay bribes to secure business.  Now, in an almost complete reversal of situations, companies that have violated the FCPA may be excluded from even being considered for international transactions in the future.  International non-profit organization Transparency International​[123]​ performs assessments and opinion surveys on the perceived levels of corruption in over 150 countries and is currently encouraging the European Union to adopt a blacklisting policy for companies found to offer bribes. ​[124]​  This would mean that if a company were to be discovered offering bribes for the purpose of retaining or obtaining business or found guilty of violating an anti-bribery law, that company would be “blacklisted” from engaging in other business relationships with companies that operate in the European Union.  This would have serious implications on American companies who are found guilty of violating the FCPA who conduct business overseas.
Both former President Ronald Reagan and former President George H. W. Bush followed a “laissez-faire, pro business policy” regarding FCPA enforcement during its initial years of enforcement so that American companies could successfully compete in the international business arena.​[125]​ However, that policy is no longer as necessary today because the international community is working towards combating the problems that the FCPA intended to address.   The FCPA is becoming part of a broader international community that is working to combat bribery and to ensure that companies are maintaining accurate accounts and records that reflect their company’s financials. In addressing the American Bar Association at the National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice commented: 
 Let me be clear about one point. We are not combating corruption and enforcing the FCPA just because it is good for the Justice Department.  We are doing so because it is good for U.S. business.  For those of you who are employed by or represent U.S. companies that want to play by the rules, the Justice Department’s FCPA enforcement efforts benefit you and your clients.  By enforcing the FCPA . . . we are making sure that your competitors do not gain an unfair advantage when competing for business.​[126]​

As American companies and their international counterparts are now operating on a more level playing field, it seems as though DOJ and SEC no longer feel as guilty for enforcing the FCPA, against American companies or foreign companies, because the necessity to pay bribes to foreign officials does not exist as predominantly as it has in the past.
VI.  Conclusion 
	Given the trend of increased FCPA enforcement, it is imperative that companies take proactive steps to ensure that they do not violate the FCPA.  In certifying that its financial accounts and records abide by the provisions of the SOX, CEOs and CFOs should also be evaluating their respective companies’ efforts towards following the FCPA provisions as well.  In general, companies benefit from a broad knowledge and understanding of the FCPA, along with good judgment and appreciation for the factors that trigger potential violations.  Companies can take two main protective steps to identify and eliminate business practices that may violate the FCPA: enact compliance programs and create written agreements.  While adherence to these steps is not required under the Act, following them will help ensure that a company is properly complying with the FCPA. ​[127]​   
The enactment of an effective compliance program that is actively implemented and enforced helps companies deter and detect potential violations of the FCPA.  The DOJ has numerous components that it considers necessary for a successful compliance program.​[128]​  If a company is able to demonstrate that it has made all reasonable efforts in terms of implementing and enforcing a compliance program in accordance with the DOJ’s guidelines, it will be difficult to prove that the company was deliberately acting with corrupt and unethical intentions of violating the Act.​[129]​  A company should also conduct due diligence to demonstrate that it has taken all reasonable efforts to abide by the FCPA.  All aspects of the due diligence process should carefully be documented to serve as evidence that the company did not have the requisite knowledge of any corrupt intent.​[130]​  For example, it is important to document that the reasons potential business relationships are created or terminated are based upon reliable factors (e.g., an individual’s expertise or incompetence) and not upon bribery.​[131]​  Companies should recognize numerous “red flags” that require special consideration before entering a business agreement with another party.​[132]​  Red flags will vary upon the particular situation and are not necessarily indicative of prohibited conduct; however, a company should be aware of their potential cause for concern and should act accordingly.  
Companies should create written agreements for international business relationships in order to help minimize the risk of prohibited conduct.​[133]​  Agreements should educate third parties about the prohibitions against bribery and their affirmative duty to maintain accurate accounts and records.  The DOJ particularly encourages companies to implement agreements that include provisions that deter prohibited conduct and outline specific consequences for failure to comply with the FCPA (e.g., termination or suspension of business agreements).​[134]​  In order to ensure that all parties fully understand the policies outlined in these agreements, language from the OECD Convention is often used.​[135]​   The language from the Convention serves as a standard point of reference, helps to minimize cultural miscommunications, and eliminates the perception that American values are being imposed in international business agreements.  If a third party is reluctant to sign such agreement or is unwilling to abide by the anti-bribery or record-keeping requirements, a company will need to determine whether the potential benefits of a business relationship are sufficient to counter the risks of doing business with a party that may engage in FCPA-prohibited conduct.​[136]​ 
By following some of these steps, companies are more likely to avoid FCPA violations, or perhaps receive less severe penalties​[137]​ if they do violate the Act.  The days of “laissez-faire” FCPA enforcement are now over, as the SOX and international community have served as stimuli to encourage the DOJ and SEC to impose the FCPA more rigorously than it ever has in the history of the Act.  FCA enforcement in the post-SOX world has led to more investigations and harsher penalties and as recent statistics have shown, the number of investigations and high penalties continue to grow each year since the SOX was enacted.  The SOX has allowed the FCPA to get back on its feet and finally take a step in the right direction towards combating bribery and fraud.  
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